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The Price of Praise in the Market for Virtue:
A Paradox of Rating and Recognizing Responsibility
ABSTRACT
In this study, I investigate how organizations respond to positive social ratings. Drawing upon
theoretical insights from the organizational literatures on reputation, information disclosure, and
commensuration, I argue that positive social ratings that define a specific and fixed threshold for
recognition can alter the market price for a signal of virtue, and thus lead high-performing
organizations to reduce their subsequent social performance. To test this hypothesis, I examine
how large public corporations responded to a social responsibility rating that evaluated and
recognized their prior philanthropic efforts. I find that firms recognized for their generosity were
more likely to reduce their subsequent philanthropic contributions, except when they were
headquartered in charitable communities and operated in socially contested industries.
Theoretically, these results provide new insights into the nuances of ratings and how they
influence subsequent organizational performance and encourage scholars to reconsider long-held
assumptions about when and how positively rated organizations will respond. From a practical
perspective, these findings highlight an unintended consequence of social ratings and provide
further insight for stakeholders interested in motivating improvements in corporate social
performance.
Keywords: ratings, reputation, information disclosure, commensuration, corporate philanthropy

Private citizens, social activists, and nongovernmental organizations have long engaged in
collective efforts to motivate improvements in corporate social performance (Soule, 2009; King
and Pearce, 2010; Briscoe and Gupta, 2016). While much of these efforts have centered around
direct forms of pressure, such as boycotts (King, 2008; McDonnell, King, and Soule, 2015),
protests (Eesley and Lenox, 2006; Hiatt, Grandy, and Lee, 2015), direct appeals to management
(Reid and Toffel, 2009; Lewis, Walls, and Dowell, 2014), and online campaigns (Zhang and
Luo, 2013; Luo, Zhang, and Marquis, 2016), in recent years an increasing number of influential
third-party organizations have indirectly sought to motivate improvements in corporate behavior
by disclosing information and rating firms based on their past performance (Sadowski, 2010). 1
Given the proliferation of these rating systems and their motivations to drive social change,
understanding how corporations respond to social ratings has become an important area of
scholarly inquiry (Tolbert, 2018). To date, scholars in this area have examined how organizations
respond to negative ratings and have generally found that poorly rated organizations tend to
improve their subsequent performance (Chatterji and Toffel, 2010; Sharkey and Bromley, 2015;
Rowley, Shipilov, and Greve, 2017). Little attention, however, has been devoted to the
performance effects of positive social ratings—that is, ratings that praise rather than shame an
organization’s exceptional social performance. This theoretical oversight may exist because both
scholars and practitioners have generally assumed that the locus of change or improvement
following a positive rating primarily lies with the unrecognized, or poorly performing
organizations (Fombrun, 1996; Sharkey and Bromley, 2015; Rowley, Shipilov, and Greve,
2017), not the organizations that are recognized for their superior performance. Indeed, implicit
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In this study, I use the term social performance broadly to incorporate all issues of societal concern. Consequently,
performance in this study, unless explicitly stated, refers to the dimensions upon which an organization is rated, not
financial performance.
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in this assumption is the notion that the positively recognized organizations would at minimum
maintain consistent levels of performance.
A few recent studies at the individual level, however, call into question this assumption by
showing that positive recognition may at times lead to reductions in future performance. Awardwinning CEOs, for example, are more likely to subsequently underperform relative to their prior
performance (Wade et al., 2006; Malmendier and Tate, 2009). Professional athletes who win
tournaments or races are more likely to see their future performance decline (Bothner, Kim, and
Smith, 2012). Although these studies all focus on individual responses to various forms of
external recognition, these findings nevertheless raise concern that theories of organizational
response to ratings might currently be inadequate. Given the possibility that positive ratings
might similarly lead to unintended reductions in organizational performance (Chatterji and
Levine, 2006) and the increased use of positive recognition as a method of motivating
improvement (Sadowski, 2010), it becomes increasingly important that scholars understand
whether and when organizations will respond to positive ratings (Chatterji and Toffel, 2010).
Contrary to the seemingly taken-for-granted assumption that only the unrecognized
organizations will respond to positive ratings, I argue and explain how positive social ratings
intended to recognize organizations for past socially responsible behavior can, under certain
conditions, lead these organizations to subsequently reduce their social performance. I treat
social ratings agencies as institutional intermediaries that broker information between
organizations and socially conscious stakeholders in market-like setting (Rindova et al., 2005;
Vogel, 2005; Fleischer, 2009; Lee, Hiatt, and Lounsbury, 2017). Drawing upon theoretical
insights from the organizational literatures on reputation, information disclosure, and
commensuration (Rindova et al., 2005; Espeland and Sauder, 2007; Chatterji and Toffel, 2010), I
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maintain that social ratings serve as signals of virtue and explain how fixed and unambiguous
rating thresholds can introduce a market price for these signals. Assuming that managers prefer
not to pay more than is necessary to signal their organization’s virtuous behavior, this new
market price may cause stakeholders to perceive all organizations whose prior performance lies
above the rating threshold as equal, which can lead high-performing organizations to reduce their
subsequent performance. Recognizing that other organizational and institutional factors might
alter the baseline market price, I also examine moderating conditions that explain when
reductions in performance are most likely to occur.
I test these predictions using ratings data from KLD Research & Analytics (KLD). While
KLD has rated public corporations across several dimensions of social performance, for this
study, I focus on one particular rating that recognizes firms for their generous philanthropic
contributions. My primary assertion is that the threshold required to receive the positive rating
clarifies and formalizes the price of a signal of generosity. Taking advantage of an exogenous
shock that occurred when KLD first issued the rating, I examine how the introduction of this new
market price influenced subsequent corporate philanthropic contributions. Although prevailing
theoretical assumptions about positive ratings would suggest that firms recognized for their
generosity would at minimum maintain their subsequent level of contributions, I find that firms
initially recognized as charitable organizations subsequently decreased their level of
philanthropic giving. I explore the introduction of a new rating that established a price for a
signal of generosity as one plausible explanation for this phenomenon.
THE PERFORMANCE EFFECTS OF POSITIVE SOCIAL RATINGS
As byproducts of the socially responsible investment (SRI) movement (Vasi and King,
2012), social ratings have been primarily designed to help socially-conscious investors “identify
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which firms are more or less responsible “ (Vogel, 2005: 39). Although the stated objective of
most social ratings agencies is to simply provide information to interested parties (Miller,
Fugate, and Golicic, 2017), many implicitly hope that the newly disclosed information will
incentivize organizations to modify their behavior and increase their subsequent social
performance (Fung, Graham, and Weil, 2007). As Paul and Lydenberg note, “these systems
clearly have an implicit social agenda. By publicizing assessments of how corporations rate
relative to each other on these issues, these ratings systems intend to push corporate management
to improve its rating—that is, these systems are intended not only to influence consumer or
employee choices, but also, and of even greater importance, to directly influence corporate
behavior” (Paul and Lydenberg, 1992: 6)
Given such motives, organizational scholars have recently sought to examine how
organizations respond to ratings and whether and when these ratings influence subsequent
organizational performance (Chatterji and Toffel, 2010; Sharkey and Bromley, 2015; Rowley,
Shipilov, and Greve, 2017). Drawing upon economic theories of information disclosure (Jin and
Leslie, 2003; Doshi, Dowell, and Toffel, 2013) and sociological theories of reactivity (Espeland
and Sauder, 2007), this stream of research has primarily focused on the performance effects of
negative ratings, arguing that the disclosure of potentially embarrassing information can provide
strong incentives to managers to improve their organization’s subsequent performance.
Consistent with this reasoning, studies have found that negative social ratings can lead
restaurants to improve their hygiene quality (Jin and Leslie, 2003) and large public companies to
reduce their toxic emissions (Chatterji and Toffel, 2010; Sharkey and Bromley, 2015) and
improve their corporate governance policies (Rowley, Shipilov, and Greve, 2017). Indeed, a
common thread among these studies is that organizations that receive negative social ratings tend
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to improve.
Although these studies collectively provide evidence that negative social ratings can drive
improvements in organizational behavior, scholars have yet to theorize and examine how
positively rated organizations respond to social ratings. This theoretical oversight can likely be
attributed to an implicit assumption that the locus of change or improvement following a positive
rating primarily lies with the unrecognized or poorly performing organizations. Some scholars,
for example, have suggested that rating systems are specifically designed “to motivate relatively
low-rated firms to improve” (Rowley, Shipilov, and Greve, 2017: 821) or that organizations
respond to ratings “primarily to avoid the negative consequences of a poor rating or to obtain the
benefits of a good rating” (Sharkey and Bromley, 2015: 68). Many rating agencies have likewise
expressed a belief that positive recognition will bring favorable attention and reputation to highperforming organizations, which will then encourage imitation or improvement by the lowperforming organizations (Fombrun, 1996). Implicit in each of these statements is an assumption
that not receiving a positive rating is indeed itself a form of punishment (i.e. a negative rating)
(Kohn, 1999) and that the organizations most likely to respond would be the unrecognized, or
poorly-performing organizations. 2
The assumption that positive ratings will not have an effect on the subsequent performance of
recognized organizations is nevertheless problematic for two primary reasons. First, recent
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While this assumption has yet to be tested rigorously, there are indeed plausible explanations for why scholars
have not given sufficient research attention to positive ratings. First, positive ratings may provide little new
information about an organization and may thus limit the incentives that organizations have to change their actions
or behaviors (Dranove and Sfekas, 2008; Jin and Leslie, 2009). Second, positive ratings may induce little to no
managerial response among positively rated organizations given the psychological tendencies to focus on the “bad”
rather than “good,” with the “bad” being much stronger than the “good” (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979; Baumeister
et al., 2001; Rozin and Royzman, 2001). Third, prior work suggests that organizations that receive a positive rating
may face strong incentives to exert additional effort to maintain predictability and reliability (Fombrun, 1996),
particularly when facing relative standards that increase over time (Sadowski, 2012; Carlos and Lewis, 2018). Given
these findings, one might assume that an organization that receives a positive rating based on its past social
performance would, at the very least, maintain that same level of performance in the future.
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studies seem to suggest that external evaluations (both positive and negative) can lead to
unintended consequences. For example, prior research at the individual level suggests that
positive evaluations (i.e. awards, prizes, recognition) may at times lead to reductions in
subsequent performance (Wade et al., 2006; Malmendier and Tate, 2009; Bothner, Kim, and
Smith, 2012; Gubler, Larkin, and Pierce, 2016). Other scholars have noted how evaluations
intended to improve social welfare in one domain can paradoxically lead to reductions in another
domain (Chatterji and Levine, 2006). Given the capacity of ratings to enact unintended changes
(Rowley, Shipilov, and Greve, 2017), it thus seems theoretically important to understand whether
and when positive ratings at the organizational level might elevate or reduce subsequent
performance (Chatterji and Toffel, 2010).
Second, positive evaluations that recognize organizations for exceptional levels of
performance are increasingly used to motivate changes in organizational behavior (Sadowski,
2010). The Dow Jones Sustainability Index (DJSI), for example, was primarily established to
identify and recognize sustainability leaders within industries (Carlos and Lewis, 2018; Hawn,
Chatterji, and Mitchell, 2018). Likewise, the magazine Business Ethics created the “100 Best
Corporate Citizens” list with the explicit objective of “pushing the envelope on what represents
good corporate citizenship” and “moving corporations towards better practices” (Waddock,
Graves, and Kelly, 2000: 17). Finally, the Carbon Disclosure Project (CDP) recently established
the Carbon Performance Leadership Index in 2010, an index focused on recognizing companies
that are taking the greatest action to reduce global emissions (CDP, 2010). Given the increased
use and reliance on positive ratings to shape organizations’ behaviors (Miller, Fugate, and
Golicic, 2017; Tolbert, 2018), it also seems practically important to understand whether positive
social ratings incentivize unrecognized organizations to imitate the recognized as previously
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assumed or if and when they might unintentionally lead to adverse consequences.
The Paradox of Rating and Recognizing Responsibility
While prevailing assumptions about social ratings suggest that positively rated organizations
would maintain or improve their subsequent social performance, I argue that positively rated
organizations may at times reduce their subsequent social performance for strategic reasons. I
build my theory on three core assertions which I support based on prior research. First, I argue
that a common objective of many firms that engage in CSR initiatives is to develop and maintain
a reputation for virtue. Second, I maintain that positive social ratings serve as both signals of
virtue that help to build or maintain a firm’s reputation for social responsibility and prices of
praise that reduce uncertainty regarding the optimal level of CSR investment. Finally, I argue
that social ratings can lead stakeholders to perceive two firms with different levels of social
performance as essentially equivalent, thus reducing the incentive to exceed the market price.
My theory focuses on two groups of actors: managers, who make allocation decisions
regarding a firm’s social investments, and stakeholders who have an interest in the firm’s social
performance, whether they be investors, employees, customers, or members of the firm’s local
community. Consistent with prior work, I assume that managers will act rationally and intend to
maximize shareholder wealth (Godfrey, 2005). I also assume that pressures from financial
markets to maximize shareholder wealth will constrain firms from overinvesting in CSR
(Margolis and Walsh, 2003; Vogel, 2005), thus limiting potential agency problems.
The Strategic Drive for a Virtuous Reputation. While motives for CSR indeed vary, most
efforts underlying CSR investments are primarily strategic in nature. Indeed, a brief review of
the CSR literature suggests that many firms are motivated to invest in CSR because they believe
that doing so will have a direct impact on the firm’s bottom line (Godfrey, Merrill, and Hansen,
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2009; Cheng, Ioannou, and Serafeim, 2014; Flammer and Luo, 2017). Other studies demonstrate
that companies engaged in CSR initiatives may also seek social or political benefits that
indirectly accrue to companies deemed to be operating in a socially acceptable manner (Marquis
and Qian, 2014; Werner, 2015; Flammer, 2018). Whether direct or indirect, the benefits that
managers often seek when engaging in CSR suggest that they believe that enhancing social
welfare will increase shareholder value (Galaskiewicz, 1997; Henisz, Dorobantu, and Nartey,
2014).
Despite these strategic motives, managers are unlikely to have a complete understanding
about how their CSR investments affect their firm’s long-term value (Wang et al., 2016). This
causal ambiguity likely exists for two reasons. First, prior research suggests that managers may
lack the necessary information required to calculate the optimal level of CSR activity due to poor
internal systems and delays in feedback (Galaskiewicz, 1997; Wang et al., 2016). Second,
multiple factors can affect broad financial measures, such as return on assets or stock returns,
making it difficult for managers to isolate the specific underlying causal mechanisms (Lev,
Petrovits, and Radhakrishnan, 2010). Collectively, these factors suggest that managers are
unlikely to know with certainty the direct economic consequences of their firms’ CSR efforts.
Although the relationship between CSR and financial performance is causally ambiguous
(Margolis and Walsh, 2003), the relationship between CSR investments and corporate reputation
has been found to be unequivocally strong (Fombrun and Shanley, 1990; Turban and Greening,
1997; Bermiss, Zajac, and King, 2014). A reputation for social responsibility is also a key
intervening mechanism in several empirical studies that examine the consequences of CSR
(Godfrey, Merrill, and Hansen, 2009; Lev, Petrovits, and Radhakrishnan, 2010; Werner, 2015),
suggesting that many firms may see a virtuous reputation as a necessary step to achieve the
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strategic outcomes that they desire. Given the tenuous relationship between CSR and financial
performance and the mediating role of socially responsible reputation, I thus maintain that a
more proximate outcome that firms hope to attain when making CSR investments is to “be
known” as a virtuous organization (Lange, Lee, and Dai, 2011), that is, to have a reputation for
social responsibility (Koh, Qian, and Wang, 2014; Tang et al., 2015; McDonnell, 2016).
Social Ratings in the Market for Virtue: Ratings as Signals and Prices of Praise
If the primary objective of a firm when engaging in CSR initiatives is to obtain a reputation
for virtue, then one must consider how a virtuous reputation is developed. Drawing upon Vogel’s
(2005) conception of a market for virtue, I maintain that firms acquire a reputation for social
responsibility through a series of market-like exchanges with stakeholders with both firms and
the stakeholders acting as buyers and sellers of valued goods or services. A firm, for example,
acts as a buyer when it seeks to “purchase” a reputation for virtue. In exchange for a virtuous
reputation, it “sells” a portfolio of CSR investments, a resource valued by the socially conscious
stakeholder. Stakeholders likewise seek to “sell” favorable perceptions (i.e. a virtuous reputation)
to the firm in order to “buy” socially responsible corporate behavior (Henderson and Malani,
2009). Theoretically, this idealized market for a virtue functions efficiently when (1)
stakeholders readily observe a firm’s past CSR investments and (2) firms have clear information
about the levels of CSR investment that they need to make in order to achieve the level of
reputation that they desire.
Markets for virtue, however, are often characterized as having imperfect information
(Chatterji and Toffel, 2010). High monitoring and evaluations costs can often make it difficult
for stakeholders to “identify which firms are more or less responsible” (Vogel, 2005: 39).
Likewise, a lack of understanding regarding how much firms need to invest in order to achieve

9

their reputational goals hampers a firm’s ability to optimize their CSR investments (Graffin and
Ward, 2010). Indeed, a market with imperfect information creates substantial uncertainty for
both market participants. For stakeholders, that uncertainty lies in the lack of clarity regarding
who is socially responsible. For managers, that uncertainty resides in the lack of a clear market
price for a virtuous reputation.
While quality uncertainty and asymmetric information have long been known to complicate
market transactions (Akerlof, 1970), they can be reduced through the third-party agencies that
evaluate and assess the CSR performance of firms. As market intermediaries (Rindova et al.,
2005; Fleischer, 2009; Lee, Hiatt, and Lounsbury, 2017), social rating agencies provide value to
market participants by (1) helping stakeholders overcome an information disadvantage (Chatterji
and Toffel, 2010) and (2) reducing uncertainty regarding the optimal levels of investment
(Graffin and Ward, 2010).
Prior research, for example, suggests that when past performance is difficult to evaluate,
stakeholders are likely to rely on strategic signals to form expectations about future behaviors
(Rindova et al., 2005; Godfrey, Merrill, and Hansen, 2009; Graffin and Ward, 2010). While they
are “not reputation ratings per se,” social ratings can nevertheless serve as “inputs for individual
stakeholder groups in their formulation of a firm’s reputation for social involvement or social
responsibility” (Godfrey, Merrill, and Hansen, 2009: 433). Thus one essential function of a
social rating is to serve as an information signal upon which stakeholders can rely to make
predictions about a firm’s willingness to act with an “other-considering” disposition (Godfrey,
Merrill, and Hansen, 2009: 428). In markets where monitoring costs are high, positive social
ratings likely substitute for direct evaluations by stakeholders and can therefore serve as strong
signals of a virtuous reputation (Rindova et al., 2005; Jin and Leslie, 2009; Bermiss, Zajac, and
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King, 2014).
A second function of social ratings is to reduce uncertainty regarding the optimal level of
CSR investment. In a world without ratings, the price required to be perceived as a virtuous firm
is uncertain and variable, due to the high transactions costs of direct observation by stakeholders
and the variation in local norms and standards regarding the appropriate and desirable levels of
CSR (Marquis, Glynn, and Davis, 2007). When the market price for a given level of reputation is
uncertain, firms are unlikely to know how much they need invest in order to achieve their desired
reputation. Positive social ratings, however, can reduce uncertainty regarding the price of a
virtuous reputation by defining fixed-standards of performance that must be met in order to
recognized (Graffin and Ward, 2010). When standards of performance are known and fixed, I
argue that thresholds between social rating categories are likely to act as price points for various
degrees of virtue, with higher ratings listed at a higher price, but also signaling greater levels of
virtue. Such information provides substantial value to firms because it reduces uncertainty about
the price that a firm will have to pay to signal virtuous behavior and achieve its reputational
goals. Because social ratings serves as signals of virtuous behavior which can lead to the
acquisition and maintenance of socially responsible reputation, I call these fixed thresholds
between ratings categories the “prices of praise.”
Ratings as Filters: Information Reduction and the Commensuration of Virtue
While social ratings can indeed facilitate market transactions by serving as signals and prices
of virtue, they also function as filters that aggregate and condense underlying performance
differences into smaller discrete units (Fleischer, 2009). After all, ratings have been
conceptualized as evaluations that compare actors against categorically defined standards of
performance (Graffin and Ward, 2010). Central to this definition is the notion that variation in
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performance is preserved between categories but not within. For example, a 4-star hotel would
be perceived as better quality than a 3-star hotel given the higher rating. Within the 4-star
category, however, two hotels would be perceived as equivalent even if their underlying quality
were different.
Known as commensuration (Espeland and Stevens, 1998; Espeland and Sauder, 2007;
Bermiss, Zajac, and King, 2014), this process of reducing and simplifying information into
defined categories can provide value to stakeholders by reducing the amount of information they
need to process in order to evaluate and compare rated firms. While cognitively efficient
(Fleischer, 2009; Waguespack and Sorenson, 2011; Orlikowski and Scott, 2014), such ratings
can nevertheless absorb important differences that exist within rating categories (March and
Simon, 1958) causing stakeholders to view positively rated firms as conceptually equivalent
(Espeland and Sauder, 2007).
Firm Response to the Price of Praise
Positively rated firms with prior levels of investment that exceed the price of praise are thus
faced with a choice to either maintain a high level of performance or reduce their subsequent
performance to the new market price. Because all firms within a rating category are viewed as
equal, I expect that a firm whose prior social performance exceeds the rating threshold will
decrease its subsequent performance. Central to my prediction is the notion that a positive social
rating is an antecedent to a reputation for virtue as it substitutes for stakeholder’s direct
evaluation (Rindova et al., 2005). Stakeholders could indeed track the CSR performance of firms
themselves, but high monitoring costs and the desire for cognitive efficiency (Fleischer, 2009;
Waguespack and Sorenson, 2011; Orlikowski and Scott, 2014) likely incentivize stakeholders to
rely on a firm’s rating rather than the underlying measure of CSR performance, which can
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ultimately lead stakeholders to view two positively rated firms with differing levels of
investments as essentially equivalent. Assuming that firms are constrained by the financial
markets from overinvesting in CSR, the rational response for a firm that receives a positive
rating would be to reduce its subsequent social performance to the rating threshold given that
there would likely be no additional benefit from exceeding the market price. Thus, contrary to
previously held assumptions, I predict that positive social ratings that recognize firms for
exceeding an established performance threshold should lead some firms to reduce rather than
maintain their subsequent performance.
Hypothesis 1: Firms positively rated and recognized for their superior social
performance will be more likely to decrease their social performance relative to other
firms.
Variation in the Market Price for Signals of Virtue
While reducing subsequent social performance after receiving a positive social rating would
presumably be an attractive option to many firms, the perceived costs and benefits of doing so
may vary depending on various moderating institutional and organizational factors that can raise
the implicit price for a signal of virtue.
The price of virtue within local communities. Studies on regional variation in CSR
suggests that most firms face substantial local incentives to engage in socially responsible
initiatives. Consistent with this notion, prior research has shown that corporate CSR activities
tend to be highly oriented towards the community in which corporate headquarters reside
(Galaskiewicz, 1997; Marquis, Glynn, and Davis, 2007). Indeed, these findings are in line with
more recent empirical work that highlights the enduring influence of local communities on
corporate behavior (Marquis, Davis, and Glynn, 2013; Tilcsik and Marquis, 2013; Marquis and
Tilcsik, 2016).
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Some of these incentives may arise from local institutions (Marquis, Glynn, and Davis,
2007). Galaskiewicz (1997), for example, described how business and community leaders in
Minneapolis established the “5-Percent Club,” a tithing club that sought to incentivize members
to give 5 percent of before-tax profits to charity. Members that met the high standard were
recognized at an annual luncheon by their peers and the public. Such recognition arguably
incentivized and encouraged philanthropic activity in the community and helped to build the
firms’ reputations among local community stakeholders. Consistent with this finding, Navarro
(1988), found that the average level of giving to be twice as high for firms in cities with tithing
clubs versus cities without tithing clubs, thus indicating the power of a local signal of virtue.
Given these findings, I propose that firms headquartered in charitable communities
historically known for high levels of corporate social action will be less likely to reduce their
subsequent social performance. Such communities are likely to have local institutions such as
tithing clubs that generate a local price for a signal of virtue that lies above the current market
price established by a positive social rating. Because a local reputation for virtue is a primary
objective when engaging in CSR, and that reputation is achieved when firms are perceived to be
positively distinctive within their local peer group (King and Whetten, 2008; Gehman and
Grimes, 2017), the existence of local price for a signal of virtue that lies above the global market
price established by the rating would likely discourage recognized firms within charitable
communities from reducing their subsequent social performance.
Hypothesis 2: Firms rated and recognized for their social performance will be less likely
to reduce their subsequent performance when headquartered in charitable communities.
The price of virtue within socially contested industries. Recent work within the CSR
literature has argued that a firm’s CSR investments can provide insurance-like protection for its
intangible assets (i.e., reputation) and that this protection can help preserve shareholder wealth
14

(Godfrey, 2005; Godfrey, Merrill, and Hansen, 2009). Known as the risk-management
hypothesis, this literature proposes that two factors determine the optimal level of CSR
investment: the level of reputational wealth at risk and the level of risk inherent in the firm’s
operations. While the level of operational risk surely has a firm-specific component, some
significant portion of this risk is determined by the industry in which the company operates
(King and Lenox, 2000; Godfrey, Merrill, and Hansen, 2009; Vasi and King, 2012).
Accordingly, an important prediction from this theoretical perspective is that the optimal level of
CSR investment will be higher for firms with higher industry-specific risk profiles.
Consistent with this prediction, a number of studies have shown that higher-risk industries
invest more in CSR (Williams and Barrett, 2000; Brammer and Millington, 2005; Brammer and
Pavelin, 2005). For example, Brammer and Pavelin (2005) found that firms operating in “highrisk” sectors contributed to charity at much higher levels than other firms. Furthermore, scholars
have found the relationship between industry-specific risk and corporate giving to be particularly
strong for firms operating within industries with significant social externalities (e.g., alcohol,
tobacco, gambling, firearms, etc.) (Brammer and Millington, 2005). Firms in the tobacco
industry, for instance, have been known to give generously to charitable causes, presumably as a
way to counter negative publicity about their products (Godfrey, Merrill, and Hansen, 2009;
Koh, Qian, and Wang, 2014).
Given these findings, I thus predict that firms operating in socially contested industries will
be less likely to reduce their subsequent performance when recognized for their past CSR
investments. Such firms arguably face a greater likelihood of experiencing a reputational loss
given the inherent risks associated with their business operations. Because CSR has been argued
to provide insurance-like protection against such losses (Godfrey, 2005; Godfrey, Merrill, and
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Hansen, 2009), firms operating in socially contested sectors that are recognized for their prior
social performance may require a higher premium in order to insure its reputation (Godfrey,
2005) and thus continue to perform at levels that exceed the price for a positive social rating.
Hypothesis 3: Firms recognized for their superior social performance will be less likely
to decrease their subsequent performance when doing business in socially contested
industries.
METHOD
Empirical context: ratings that recognize corporate generosity
To test my hypotheses, I examine how large public corporations responded to the
introduction of a positive social rating that recognized a company’s social performance. As a
relatively recent phenomenon emerging over the last 30 years (Sadowski, 2010; Flammer, 2013;
Ioannou and Serafeim, 2015), the rise and proliferation of social ratings is a favorable context in
which to study how organizations respond to positive ratings as it allows a researcher to examine
changes in firm behavior and performance in response to an exogenous introduction of a rating.
Specifically, I use social ratings data from the KLD STATS database, generally considered
the largest and most widely used corporate social performance database available to the public
and the “de facto research standard” for CSR scholars (Chin, Hambrick, and Treviño, 2013;
Flammer and Luo, 2017; Gehman and Grimes, 2017). Founded in 1988 (Godfrey, 2011), KLD
began rating companies in 1991 with an explicit objective of providing information to sociallyminded investors that would help them identity which companies were behaving in a more or
less responsible manner (Chatterji and Toffel, 2010; Flammer, 2013; Carroll, Primo, and Richter,
2016). Implicit in this objective, however, was also a desire to bring about improvements in
social responsibility (Lydenberg, 2005). As one of the founders once stated, “Our interest is to
increase corporate accountability. The goal here is to have a long-term impact. I think that’s the
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big shift in social investing. Historically it was sin avoidance and now it’s another voice for
social change” (Gumbel, 1991).
While KLD has rated firms across several dimensions of social performance for many years,
for this study, I focus on one sub rating that evaluates a firm’s charitable giving practices.
Corporate philanthropy is an ideal context in which to test my theory for a number of reasons.
First, a reputation for generosity has been argued and shown to be a strategic goal for many large
publication corporations (Godfrey, 2005; Muller and Kräussl, 2011; Marquis and Lee, 2013).
Second, costs of evaluating and comparing corporate generosity on an individual basis create
substantial uncertainty in the minds of investors regarding which firms are more or less
charitable, thus increasing the efficacy of social ratings as signals of corporate generosity. Third,
the KLD rating that evaluates corporate giving is one of the few sub ratings that defines a
specific performance standard required for recognition which, according to my theory, should be
perceived as a new price for a generosity rating. Finally, long-held concerns about the legitimacy
of corporate philanthropy likely constrain firms that do wish to acquire or maintain a reputation
for generosity from “overinvesting” (Friedman, 1970; Jensen, 2002; Margolis and Walsh, 2003).
Given these characteristics, corporate philanthropy appears to be an opportune context in which
to test my theory as it closely fits the conditions under which I would expect positively rated
firms to reduce their subsequent performance.
Data sources and sample
To construct my sample, I manually coded data on the level of corporate philanthropic
contributions from the Taft Directory of Corporate Giving (TDCG), the National Directory of
Corporate Giving (NDCG), and the National Center for Charitable Statistics (NCCS), sources on
corporate philanthropy that have been used in prior organizational research (Wang, Choi, and Li,
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2008; Lev, Petrovits, and Radhakrishnan, 2010; Tilcsik and Marquis, 2013). Using these data, I
then created a panel of 475 firms over the period 1991–1996. Because I was interested in
understanding how firms responded to the initial KLD rating, I compared the firms’ charitable
contributions before and after being rated, and used as a control group firms that were not rated.
Sample firms met all of the following criteria: (1) were listed at least once in the TDCG or
NDCG during the pre-rating (1991–1993) and post-rating (1994–1996) periods, (2) were
members of the S&P 500 or Midcap 400 Index at some point during the window of observation,
and (3) were established public companies during or before 1991. I show a breakdown of the
sample by rating status, community, and industry in Table 1. I also provide descriptive statistics
and correlations in Table 2.
Insert Tables 1 & 2 here
Dependent variable
Scholars have evaluated corporate philanthropy as a dependent variable in a number of
different ways. Some studies have used the total amount of contributions (Atkinson and
Galaskiewicz, 1988; Galaskiewicz, 1997; Marquis and Lee, 2013) or have scaled philanthropy
by total revenue as a way to control for differences in firm size (Brammer and Millington, 2008).
Recent studies have also evaluated corporate generosity by examining the likelihood or speed of
a philanthropic response following natural disasters (Muller and Kräussl, 2011; Zhang and Luo,
2013; Luo, Zhang, and Marquis, 2016; Zhang, Marquis, and Qiao, 2016). In this study, I chose to
evaluate corporate generosity as the total amount of grants given to charity through a corporate
foundation or given by the corporation directly, divided by the level of pretax income for each
firm. Such a transformation facilitates the comparison of giving across various firms and is
consistent with KLD’s evaluation of corporate philanthropic behavior (see below). Furthermore,
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prior research suggests that the ratio of total giving to pretax profit is a commonly used metric
when determining the optimal level of contributions for a given fiscal year (Lydenberg, Marlin,
and Strub, 1986; McElroy and Siegfried, 1986; Coady, 2006). 3
Independent variables
Positive rating. For this study, I specifically focused on a rating that evaluated a firm’s
charitable giving practices. KLD gave an initial positive rating to firms that had consistently
given over 1.5 percent of trailing three-year net earnings before taxes, or had otherwise been
notably generous in their giving. Because KLD’s decision to initially rate these firms was
unrelated to prior firm behavior or performance and because firms had no influence on the
decision to be rated, I maintain that these initial ratings constitute an exogenous shock. To
distinguish between charitable and non-charitable firms, I created a dummy variable, initial
positive rating, for firms that were recognized for their charitable giving practices. I also created
a dummy variable, no initial positive rating, for firms that were rated by KLD, but were not
noted for their charitable giving practices. I then interacted these firm-level dummy variables
with a time-varying dummy variable, KLD rated, coded “1” starting in 1994 for the years in
which firms that were rated by KLD, and “0” otherwise. 4

3

Using pretax income as a way to control for differences in firm size can nevertheless create problems for empirical
analysis, especially when pretax income falls below zero. Rather than remove these observations from the analysis,
however, I instead replaced negative values (approximately 6% of the sample) with predicted values generated
through a linear interpolation. Because total contributions are divided by pretax income, empirical problems can also
result when pretax income is very small. To address this concern, I replaced levels of giving that exceeded 10
percent of pretax profits (less than 1% of the sample) with predicted values generated through a linear interpolation.
I specifically chose this threshold because 10 percent of pretax profits is the maximum deduction allowed for
corporate charitable contributions. Although such transformations reduce the influence of outliers by smoothing
levels of giving over time, removing these outliers did not substantively change the results or conclusions.
4
The initial rating was based on performance data from 1991, but not widely available to the public until 1993. See
the Appendix for a brief history regarding the establishment and timing of the initial KLD ratings.
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Prior to the issuance of the KLD ratings, few sources of information existed that would have
facilitated the comparison of corporate generosity across a large number of firms. 5 Such a lack of
transparency and information made it both difficult for interested stakeholders to make
comparisons among firms and thus form reputational beliefs about which firms were more or less
responsible (Vogel, 2005). Indeed, this lack of information regarding corporate social
performance was one of the primary motivating drivers behind the establishment of the KLD
ratings (Godfrey, 2011). Given these assertions, it is therefore unlikely that any observed
response by rated firms would have been caused by any factor other than the KLD rating.
Charitable communities. Following prior research (Marquis, Davis, and Glynn, 2013;
Tilcsik and Marquis, 2013; Marquis and Tilcsik, 2016), I operationalized a local community as a
core-based statistical area (CBSA) established by the Office of Management and Budget.
According to the Census Bureau, a CBSA is a “core area containing a large population nucleus,
together with adjacent communities having a high degree of economic and social integration
with that core.” In his seminal work on corporate philanthropy, Galaskiewicz (1997) found that
social clubs dedicated to local giving often led to an increase in corporate contributions. Known
as tithing clubs, these organizations typically established recognition thresholds between 2 and 5
percent of pretax profits (Lydenberg, Marlin, and Strub, 1986) which are well above KLD’s

5

Although the Conference Board issued an annual industry-level survey of philanthropic donations beginning in
1974, firms were not individually recognized for superior levels of giving, nor were interested stakeholders able to
make comparisons of generosity across a large number of firms. Fortune magazine also issued its well-known
World’s Most Admired Companies rankings beginning in 1983, which a specific sub dimension that evaluated
community and environmental responsibility. Only the top and bottom three ranked companies for this particular
sub dimension, however, were actually listed in the magazine. Furthermore, companies could also demonstrate
social and environmental responsibility in many other ways besides corporate donations. Given these factors, it is
therefore unlikely that the Fortune rankings would have been used as a significant source of information on
corporate giving. In 1986, Steven Lydenberg, a cofounder of KLD, published a book titled Rating America’s
Corporate Conscience that compiled data and assessments of various social and environmental practices of
corporations but was limited to approximately 100 firms (Godfrey, 2011). Given these historical facts, it becomes
clear that the average investor who had interest in evaluating corporate generosity would have had a difficult time
determining which firms were more or less charitable (Vogel, 2005) due to high transaction costs associated with
monitoring and tracking corporate philanthropic behavior.
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rating threshold of 1.5 percent. Indeed such high levels required for recognition likely
incentivized interested firms to increase their level of giving. I therefore coded charitable
community as “1” for CBSAs that have tithing clubs, and “0” otherwise (see Table 1b for a
complete list). A dummy variable, non-charitable community, was coded as the inverse of
charitable community.
Socially contested industries. Prior research indicates that firms with significant negative
social externalities will donate more to charity (Brammer and Millington, 2005; Brammer and
Pavelin, 2005), presumably because such firms require a higher premium to insure their
reputational assets (Brammer and Pavelin, 2005; Godfrey, Merrill, and Hansen, 2009). Given
these findings, I thus created a dummy variable socially contested industry for firms that were
involved in at least one or more of the following industries: alcoholic beverage, firearms,
defense, gambling, forestry, mining, and tobacco industries (Hong and Kacperczyk, 2009; Hong
and Kostovetsky, 2012; Koh, Qian, and Wang, 2014). Such firms, I maintain, may have
insurance premiums that lie above the rating threshold that can thus constrain them from
reducing their subsequent levels of giving. A dummy variable, non-socially contested industry,
was coded as the inverse of the variable socially contested industry.
Control variables. Because the level of corporate generosity is not likely to be unilaterally
determined by a social rating, I sought to control for other factors that might also influence
corporate philanthropic behavior. I controlled for effects of community norms (Marquis, Glynn,
and Davis, 2007; Marquis and Tilcsik, 2016), corporate reputation (Zhang and Luo, 2013; Luo,
Zhang, and Marquis, 2016), and other unobserved time-invariant factors using community
(CBSA codes), industry (2-digit SIC codes), and firm fixed effects. 6 I also controlled for time-

6

While a small number of firms experienced a change in firm headquarters or industry during the window of
analysis, the majority experienced no change in geographic location or industry. Consequently, such effects, if they
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variant factors such as organization size and slack using total revenue and foundation assets
(Marquis and Lee, 2013; Tilcsik and Marquis, 2013), financial profitability using return on
assets (ROA) (Luo, Zhang, and Marquis, 2016; Zhang, Marquis, and Qiao, 2016), and changes
in tax positions using firm-specific marginal tax rates (Lev, Petrovits, and Radhakrishnan,
2010). Because the level of contributions is likely to be influenced by industry peers, I also
include the contributions of industry peers at the 2-digit SIC level (Marquis and Tilcsik, 2016). 7
Finally, I included year dummies to control for unobserved time-variant factors that affect all
firms such as changes in societal norms.
Model specification
I tested my hypotheses using difference-in-differences (DID) estimation. The primary appeal
of DID lies in its potential to circumvent many of the selection issues that can arise when
evaluating the performance effects of ratings (Chatterji and Toffel, 2010). Employed widely
within the field of economics, DID has become an increasingly popular way to estimate causal
relationships (Bertrand, Duflo, and Mullainathan, 2004) and has been used in many recent
studies within the management discipline (Bernstein, 2012; Flammer, 2015; Gubler, Larkin, and
Pierce, 2016).
To evaluate the causal impact of being rated and recognized as a charitable organization on
subsequent charitable donations, I compared the trends in philanthropic contributions for firms
first rated and recognized by KLD with firms that were rated but not recognized and firms that
were never rated. Including the latter group controlled for unobserved factors that could affect

do exist, will be subsumed within the firm-specific fixed effect.
7
I obtained this measure from IRS Source Book for the years 1988-1995 by calculating the level contributions as a
percentage of total sales for all firms with more than $250 million in assets.
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the charitable contributions of all, not just rated, firms. I tested Hypothesis 1 by estimating the
following ordinary least squares (OLS) regression: 8
𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝛽𝛽1 𝐾𝐾𝐾𝐾𝐾𝐾 𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 × 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝 𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽2 𝐾𝐾𝐾𝐾𝐾𝐾 𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖

× 𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝 𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽3 𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽4 𝛾𝛾𝑡𝑡 + 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖 + 𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖

Yit refers to the charitable contributions of firm i in year t, 𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 is a vector of control variables, 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖
is a series of firm-fixed effects, and 𝛾𝛾𝑡𝑡 is a series of year dummies.

To test the moderating effects described in Hypotheses 2 and 3, I interacted all variables in

the model shown above with two dummy variables. For example, the model that tests
Hypotheses 2 interacts all variables with charitable community and non-charitable community.
All models tested for significant differences between firms initially recognized for their
charitable contributions, those rated but not recognized, and those never rated. These interactions
not only allowed for comparisons between subcategories, but also within subcategories. 9
Insert Figure 1 here
RESULTS
I first examined the raw data to look for evidence of whether firms’ philanthropic donations
changed after being rated. I found that firms initially recognized as charitable organizations gave
on average 2.33 percent in the pre-rating period and 1.85 percent in the post-rating period (see
Figure 1). This drop of 0.48 percentage points stands in contrast to the change experienced by
firms not initially recognized for their giving, for which the level of giving increased only

8

Following Chatterji and Toffel (2010), I included two interaction terms in our model to facilitate interpretation of
the regression coefficients. The coefficient on the first interaction term directly tests Hypothesis 1. An alternative
way of testing the hypothesis would be to include the main effect (KLD rated) with one of the interaction terms
(e.g., KLD rated X positive rating). In this instance, however, the two OLS coefficients would have to be added
together to determine whether the performance effect of positive ratings differed from that of the unrated firms.
9
While the interaction models are identical to running separate regressions on split samples, interacting both dummy
variables (e.g., charitable and noncharitable community) with all other variables facilitates the comparison of
coefficients.
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slightly from 1.10 percent to 1.11 percent. I found these differences to be statistically
significant. 10
The efficacy of this research design also depended on the assumption that the philanthropic
contributions of each group of newly rated firms would have followed the trend of the unrated
firms had KLD not issued their ratings. While not directly testable, this assumption would be
strengthened if I found that the giving trends of all groups were similar during the pre-rating
period. To test this assumption, I compared trends during the pre-rating period (1991–1993)
across the three groups. Using a regression model (see Table A1 in the Appendix), I found no
statistically significant differences in the trends of philanthropic contributions across the three
groups—those initially rated and recognized, those rated but not initially recognized, and those
never rated (see also Figure 1).
Insert Table 3 here
Table 3 presents the results of the models that test Hypothesis 1. The results of the baseline
model indicate that firms initially recognized as charitable organizations reduced their
subsequent charitable contributions by 0.48 percentage points less than firms never rated (β = 0.477, p < 0.01), a magnitude equal to approximately four tenths of one standard deviation
(calculated as β = -0.477 divided by the standard deviation of philanthropic contributions =
1.27). A Wald test comparing the coefficients of the two interaction terms revealed that firms
initially rated superior reduced their contributions more than firms that were rated but not

10

To determine whether the difference in trends was statistically significant, I used OLS pooled regression (with
robust standard errors clustered by firm) to estimate the following model: y = β1Pi + β2NPI + β3(Pi x Rit) + β4(NPi x
Rit) where y = total contributions as a percentage of pretax profits, Pi is a firm-level dummy coded ’1’ for firms that
initially received a positive rating, NPi is a firm-level dummy coded ’1’ for firms that were rated but did not receive
a positive rating, and Rit is a dummy coded ’1’ for years in which a firm was rated by KLD. The statistical difference
of the difference in trends was determined using a Wald test of the equality β3 = β4, which yielded F = 6.26, p < .01.
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recognized for the charitable giving (F = 8.37, p < 0.01). These results are consistent with the
predictions of Hypothesis 1.
Recent research on the validity of DID estimates, however, suggests that the serial
correlation associated with repeated observations may lead to understated standard errors,
leading to serious overestimation of t-statistics and significance levels (Bertrand, Duflo, and
Mullainathan, 2004). To address this issue, I followed Bertrand et al.’s suggested remedy of
aggregating the time-series data into a pre- and post-period for each firm. As shown in column 2,
the results continue to hold with no substantive changes in estimates.
Insert Table 4 here
Table 4 presents the results for Hypotheses 2. As shown in column 1, the negative
statistically significant coefficient on non-charitable community x KLD rated x initial positive
rating indicates that firms in non-charitable communities that were recognized for their giving
practices reduced their contributions by 0.55 percentage points (p < 0.01), about four tenths of
one standard deviation (calculated as β = -0.545/SD = 1.27) more than firms in the control group
(i.e., firms that were never rated). A Wald test comparing the coefficients C and D reveals that
firms in non-charitable communities that were initially rated superior also reduced their
contributions to a greater extent than firms in non-charitable communities that were not
recognized for their giving (Wald test F = 7.14, p < 0.01). The insignificance on the first and
second interaction terms indicates that the effect of an initial positive rating on a firm’s
philanthropic contributions is only present in non-charitable communities. Overall, the results
support Hypothesis 2 by indicating that among firms in non-charitable communities, those that
receive a superior rating will decrease their contributions to a greater extent than other firms.
Insert Table 5 here
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Results for Hypothesis 3 are shown in Table 5. As displayed in column 1, the statistically
negative coefficient on non-socially contested industry x KLD rated x initial positive rating
indicates that firms operating in non-socially contested industries that were recognized for their
giving practices reduced their contributions by 0.54 percentage points (p < 0.01), again about
four tenths of one standard deviation (calculated as β = -0.544/SD = 1.27) more than did firms in
the control group (firms that were never rated). A Wald test comparing the coefficients C and D
reveals that firms in non-socially contested industries that were initially rated positive also
reduced their contributions to a greater extent than firms in non-socially contested industries that
were not recognized for their giving (F = 8.80, p < 0.01). No significant differences were found
among firms operating in socially contested industries (comparison of coefficients A and B).
These results support Hypothesis 3 by indicating that among firms in non-socially contested
industries, those that receive a positive rating decrease their contributions to a greater extent than
other firms.
Robustness tests
Although the findings are broadly consistent with our main theoretical arguments, there are
indeed alternative explanations. The most threatening concern is that the observed reduction in
contributions for recognized firms may simply be due to regression to the mean. This argument
is particularly relevant if we assume that reductions in contributions may have occurred for
purely stochastic rather than strategic reasons (Bothner, Kim, and Smith, 2012). 11
To thus rule out this concern, I first examined trends among the three groups six years prior
to the time I would have expected firms to respond (1988-1993). If the subsequent reductions in

11

For example, it could very well be that some firms randomly gave at higher levels in the years preceding the
rating and were consequently recognized as charitable organizations by KLD. If this were indeed the case,
subsequent reductions could be considered random fluctuations rather than actual responses.
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charitable giving among the rated and recognized firms were indeed driven by mean reversion,
then one would likely observe a random “bump” in charitable contributions for this group in the
pre-treatment period. As shown in Figure A2 (see Appendix), there appears to be no random
increase in charitable contributions during the pre-rating period for the rated and recognized
firms. Indeed, firms ultimately rated and recognized for their generosity had for many years
given more than 2% of their pretax profits to charity, thus casting doubt on mean reversion as a
confounding explanation.
To more formally rule out mean reversion, I also performed a series of placebo regressions
during the pretreatment period. First, using the same decision rules that KLD utilized in 1991
and 1992 to rate and recognize corporate generosity, I assigned firms to one of the three groups
(rated and recognized, rated but not recognized, and never rated) based on their charitable
contributions in 1988. The results for this baseline specification revealed that over this time
period (1988-1993), firms that ultimately received a positive rating maintained similar trends in
the corporate contributions when compared to the control group of firms (unrated) and the firms
that were ultimately rated but not recognized (see column 1 in Table A4). If the findings in my
main analysis were indeed driven by mean reversion, I would have likely found similar
reductions in charitable reductions during the prerating period. The absence of such a decrease
lends support to the notion that the actual decrease observed in Figure 1 is not driven by
regression to the mean.
Following Chay et al. (2005), I also created two additional placebo treatments: extreme and
reverse. In the extreme placebo treatment, I set the contribution threshold required for
recognition at 2.25% of pretax earnings (≈ 93rd percentile) which was roughly twice as stringent
as the original threshold of 1.5% of pretax earnings (≈ 86th percentile). In the reverse placebo
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treatment, I falsely “recognized” firms that gave less than 0.45% of pretax earnings (≈ 14th
percentile). If my results were indeed drive by mean reversion, I would have expected the
extreme treatment regression to produce estimates similar in sign, but larger in magnitude and
the reverse treatment to produce estimates of the opposite sign but similar magnitude. As shown
in columns 2 and 3 of Table A4 respectively, these additional placebo tests do not falsely
generate significant treatment effects as one would expect if the results were driven solely by
mean reversion. Based on these findings and my main results, I thus conclude that firms that
ultimately received a positive rating by KLD maintained consistently high levels of giving
during the pre-rating period, and then responded to the rating beginning in 1994 by reducing
their subsequent contributions (see Figure 1).
DISCUSSION
As strategic actors, organizations respond to various external signals such as ratings in order
to manage their long-term objectives such as organizational reputation. Although prior studies
have noted how organizations will respond to negative ratings by improving their subsequent
performance, I argued and explained how positive ratings could also elicit an organizational
response, albeit in ways that would paradoxically reduce rather than enhance performance.
Drawing upon organizational theories of reputation, information disclosure, and
commensuration, I proposed that positive ratings that defined a specific performance threshold
for recognition could lead high-performing organizations whose prior performance exceeded the
rating threshold to lower their subsequent performance by effectively setting a new “price” for
signal of virtue, one that most organizations that wished to establish or maintain a reputation for
virtue, barring other economic or institutional pressures, would strive not to exceed.
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To test this assertion, I examined how being rated as a charitable organization influenced a
firm’s subsequent level of philanthropic contributions. Even after accounting for obvious
confounding factors such a mean reversion, I found that firms that exceeded the performance
threshold were more likely to decrease their subsequent contributions than other firms, arguably
because the firm could still achieve its goal of a reputation for virtue at a lower price. Such
reductions, however, were less likely to occur in firms located in communities with strong
normative pressures that favor corporate involvement in the community as well as in firms with
higher levels of industry-specific risk, such as those operating in socially contested industries. In
both instances, I maintain that the optimal level of giving likely exceeded the threshold required
for recognition and thus constrained firms from reducing their subsequent charitable
contributions.
Together, these findings extend scholarly work by refining our understanding about the
performance effects of ratings and the costs of acquiring and maintaining a reputation. For
scholars and practitioners interested in corporate responsibility, these findings also demonstrate
that there are certain risks associated with recognizing responsibility: that efforts to promote
increased social performance may paradoxically lead to reductions in social performance.
The Performance Effects of Ratings
The primary contribution of this study speaks to a recent stream of research that examines the
performance impact of ratings on rated organizations (Chatterji and Toffel, 2010; Sharkey and
Bromley, 2015; Rowley, Shipilov, and Greve, 2017). A common theme among this stream of
research is that poorly rated organizations tend to improve. In this study, I extend this growing
body of research by examining the performance effects of positive ratings. To date, the existing
body of literature has implicitly assumed that the locus of change following a positive rating lies
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with the unrecognized or poorly performing organization (Fombrun, 1996; Sharkey and
Bromley, 2015; Rowley, Shipilov, and Greve, 2017). Contrary to this assumption, I find that
positive ratings that define an unambiguous and fixed threshold for recognition can lead
recognized organizations to reduce their subsequent performance. This finding thus demonstrates
that is important for ratings scholars to examine the nuances of rating characteristics such as
rating thresholds and how they might incentivize organizations to respond to ratings in ways that
were previously unanticipated.
My findings also highlight the role of information disclosure in facilitating or impeding
social comparison. Recent research, for example, has argued that rankings can facilitate social
comparison and thus trigger an organizational response among the ranked entities (Espeland and
Sauder, 2007; Luo, Zhang, and Marquis, 2016). While ratings can likewise facilitate comparison
among organizations that fall into different rating categories (Fleischer, 2009; Wang, Wezel, and
Forgues, 2016), my theory suggests that ratings may actually hinder social comparison among
organizations in the same rating category by absorbing important differences in performance into
one common metric. Such hindrance is particularly likely for binary ratings that clump rated
entities into two distinct categories where variation within the category is by definition
maximized. Coupled with stakeholders preferences’ for cognitive efficiency and the lack of
direct performance evaluations by stakeholders (Fleischer, 2009; Waguespack and Sorenson,
2011; Orlikowski and Scott, 2014), this process of commensuration can lead stakeholders to
view similarly rated organizations as essentially equivalent, thus removing an incentive for
positively rated organizations who previously sought to differentiate themselves to continue to
maintain a level of performance beyond what is necessary to meet the rating criteria. Given these
contrasting arguments, my findings suggest that scholars who study organizational responses to
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information disclosure should carefully consider the ways in which differing forms of
information (i.e. rankings vs. ratings) facilitate or impede social comparison.
While it was not a primary objective of this study, I did find that firms that were rated but not
recognized seemed unresponsive to the initial rating (see Figure 1). Rather than increase their
subsequent contributions in order to be rated, this group appeared to give at the same level as if
the rating had never been issued. Because prior research has found that firms respond to negative
ratings (Jin and Leslie, 2003; Chatterji and Toffel, 2010; Sharkey and Bromley, 2015), one could
assume that firms that were unrecognized might increase the level of their contributions in
subsequent years, that is, if not being recognized was equivalent to being shamed (Kohn, 1999).
Such results would have been consistent with KLD’s belief that the reputation that presumably
follows positive recognition would motivate the unrecognized firms to improve (Fombrun,
1996). Although I did not directly observe the actual motivations underlying these firms’ actions,
scholars have long argued that CSR is better understood as one dimension of corporate strategy
(Vogel, 2005) and that firms will choose different levels of investment on the risk and
opportunities they face (Godfrey, 2005; Godfrey, Merrill, and Hansen, 2009). Given this
argument, it is therefore plausible that low-performing firms were unresponsive to the ratings
simply because they did not view philanthropy as essential to the strategic purposes of their firm.
The fact that these firms gave at all might be better explained by institutional mechanisms such
as the desire for legitimacy (Marquis, Glynn, and Davis, 2007; Marquis and Tilcsik, 2016).
Taken together, these findings suggest scholars should carefully consider the underlying motives
of organizations and how they might amplify or attenuate an organization’s response to a rating.
After all, not all organizations will desire to be positively distinctive within their peer group
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(Gehman and Grimes, 2017) but may simply seek to meet the minimum standards of
acceptability (King and Whetten, 2008).
Because the hypotheses were tested in a very specific context, it is important to consider
whether performance reductions following a positive rating would be found with other types of
rating schemes. As noted earlier, one particularly important aspect of this study was that the
rating defined a specific performance threshold. Not all ratings, however, define specific
performance thresholds. In fact, some rating agencies may deliberately prefer ambiguous
standards in order to maintain power and control over the rating process (Fleischer, 2009;
Graffin and Ward, 2010; Waguespack and Sorenson, 2011; Hsu, Roberts, and Swaminathan,
2012). It could very well be a necessary condition for a rating to define a specific threshold in
order for positively rated organization to reduce their subsequent performance. Scholars could
therefore extend this work by examining how organizations respond to positive ratings that do
not define specific performance thresholds.
In a similar manner, thresholds between rating categories may be specifically defined but
nevertheless relative thus creating uncertainty about the standards of performance required to be
recognized in the future. For example, while the Dow Jones Sustainability Index (top 10 percent
within a sector) and 100 Best Corporate Citizens (top 100) list annually recognizes the top
performing firms based on fixed criteria, the performance required to be included on these lists
can change from year to year based on the relative performance of the rated company’s peers
(Carlos and Lewis, 2018; Lewis and Carlos, 2018). Such uncertainty regarding the level of
performance required to be recognized arguably incentivizes previously recognized firms to
continue to maintain or improve their performance. Given these arguments, it may also be
necessary for a rating threshold to not only be specific, but also fixed in order for positively rated
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organizations to reduce their subsequent performance. Future research could thus extend this
work by examining and comparing the performance effects of fixed versus relative rating
thresholds.
Finally, some ratings are binary (e.g. KLD ratings) while others contain multiple categories
(e.g. 5-star rating) (Graffin and Ward, 2010; Bowers and Prato, 2018). Binary ratings, by
definition, are the most likely ratings to create incentives for positively rated organizations to
reduce their subsequent performance given that they necessarily clump, and thus mask a wider
degree of performance levels within the same category. This masking effect, however, likely
decreases as the number of rating categories increases. Consequently, future research could also
examine whether the negative performance effect of a positive rating diminishes as the number
of rating categories increase.
Reputation Acquisition and Management
My results also provide insights into the process by which organizations acquire and manage
their reputation. While much has been written about benefits that accrue to organizations with a
strong reputation (Fombrun, 1996; Pollock and Barnett, 2012; George et al., 2016a), scholars
have given limited attention to costs of acquiring and maintaining a strong reputation. 12 Here, I
address this issue directly by examining how an explicit market price for a signal of virtue can
influence an organization’s subsequent CSR investment.
Although I found that recognized firms on average did appear to desire continued recognition
in order to develop a generous reputation (as evidenced by their continued investments above the
rating threshold), they were nevertheless cognizant about the costs of acquiring and maintaining
that signal (as evidenced by their subsequent decrease relative to their pre-rating investment

12

Indeed, this gap in knowledge is somewhat understandable given that reputation can be impacted by multiple
factors which can make it difficult to attribute enhancements in reputation to specific organizational investments.
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levels). Despite these patterns of behavior, I did find that some firms maintained similar levels of
corporate generosity when headquartered in communities with tithing clubs and when they
operated in socially-contested industries. In such instances, the perceived benefits of a local
reputation (Galaskiewicz, 1997; Doshi, Dowell, and Toffel, 2013) or more comprehensive
insurance coverage (Godfrey, 2005; Godfrey, Merrill, and Hansen, 2009) appeared to outweigh
the additional costs of tithing club membership (2-5% of pre-tax profits) or a higher insurance
premium (something above the market current price of 1.5%). Together, these findings
demonstrate that firms will explicitly consider and compare the costs and benefits of acquiring
and maintaining a reputation. Given these results, scholars of organizational reputation should
likewise more carefully consider, when possible, the economic costs of acquiring or maintaining
a reputation and how such knowledge could influence a firm’s subsequent reputational
investments. Incorporating the costs and benefits of reputation acquisition is indeed of theoretical
value because it helps scholars to better understand whether and when positive ratings will lead
to reductions in performance (Chatterji and Toffel, 2010).
The Paradox of Rating and Recognizing Responsibility
Rating agencies interested in corporate responsibility have often used their positive
evaluations as a way to increase transparency and reduce information asymmetry (Chatterji and
Levine, 2006; Chatterji, Levine, and Toffel, 2009). Frequently coupled with this objective is an
implicit assumption that recognizing good behavior can motivate unrecognized corporations to
improve their subsequent performance (Paul and Lydenberg, 1992; Fombrun, 1996; Waddock,
Graves, and Kelly, 2000; Sadowski, 2010; Tolbert, 2018). Consistent with this assumption, many
rating agencies continue to use positive ratings as a way to incentivize improvements in
corporate accountability and performance (Waddock, Graves, and Kelly, 2000; CDP, 2010;
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Sadowski, 2010).
Yet despite the fact that scholars and practitioners have for many years recognized the
potential of social ratings to enact change in corporate social performance (Paul and Lydenberg,
1992; Sadowski, 2010), the effectiveness of positive social ratings has yet to be addressed.
Seeking to extend this line of inquiry, I sought to understand how positively rated firms would
respond to a social rating and whether and when such recognition could impact subsequent social
performance. I found evidence to suggest that efforts to promote corporate responsibility through
positive social ratings can paradoxically lead to reductions in social performance. Specifically, I
found that ratings that were implicitly intended to drive increases in corporate philanthropy
actually led to overall decline in the level of corporate philanthropic contributions, an outcome
certainly unintended by KLD.
These findings thus suggest that there may be unintended consequences when recognizing
social responsibility (Kerr, 1975; Chatterji and Levine, 2006; Wang et al., 2016): that efforts to
promote responsible corporate behavior may prove to be unhelpful or even harmful. I do not
mean to suggest that such efforts are useless, only that the potential negative effects need to be
taken into consideration. Although we need more research regarding the performance effects of
positive ratings, given what we know about the efficacy of negative ratings (Jin and Leslie, 2003;
Chatterji and Toffel, 2010; Sharkey and Bromley, 2015), these findings imply that policy makers
and stakeholders who have an interest in motivating increased corporate responsibility may want
to focus on singling out the poor performers rather than recognizing the good.
From a practical perspective, these results also provide rating agencies with valuable
information about how rating systems might be designed to more effectively maximize impact
and minimize gaming (Paul and Lydenberg, 1992; Sadowski, Whitaker, and Ayars, 2011;
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Gubler, Larkin, and Pierce, 2016; Luca and Zervas, 2016). For example, my theory and results
suggest that positive ratings that are binary are more likely to cause strategic reductions in
performance (i.e. gaming) by rated organizations. Consistent with this prediction, many social
rating agencies, which were historically derived from positive and negative social screens, have
since switched from a binary rating system to one that incorporates multiple performance
categories and even continuous measures of performance. 13 Future research could thus examine
these new rating schemes to see whether multi-category ratings are more effective at increasing
impact and reducing gaming behavior.
While my results suggest that recognizing firms for their corporate philanthropy led to an
overall net decrease in the level of giving, I did not directly examine how such reductions would
impact overall social welfare. Given that higher levels of corporate generosity were recognized
as a strength, one could presume that KLD perceived higher (lower) levels of corporate
philanthropy as an outcome that would be socially beneficial (detrimental). Although I did not
empirically address this outcome, recent research suggests that corporate contributions can,
under certain conditions, lead to increased social welfare (Kaul and Luo, 2018). Given this
research, it is indeed plausible that KLD’s generosity rating may have led to an overall decline in
social welfare. Future research could therefore extend this work by directly addressing the
welfare impacts of social ratings. By so doing, scholars could indeed contribute to a growing
conversation to understand the conditions under which corporate social initiatives like
philanthropy are most likely to yield societal benefits (George et al., 2016b; Wang et al., 2016;
Ballesteros, Useem, and Wry, 2017).

13

The MSCI ESG ratings, the successor rating scheme to the KLD ratings, now evaluates key sustainability issues
on a 1-10 scale (MSCI, 2018).
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Table 1. Sample breakdown
Panel A. Number of firms in sample
Total number
of firms

Initial
positive rating

No initial
positive rating

Count

%

Count

%

Count

%

Count

%

475

100

65

14

294

62

116

24

Charitable community

62

13

13

3

36

8

13

3

Non-charitable community

413

87

52

11

258

54

103

22

Socially contested industry

50

11

11

2

35

7

4

1

Non-socially contested industry

425

89

54

11

259

55

112

24

Full sample:

Firms never
rated

Split samples:
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Table 1. Sample breakdown
Panel B: Community composition
CBSA
Code
CBSA Name

Number of firms

35620

New York-Northern New Jersey-Long Island, NY-NJ-PA MSA

58

16980

Chicago-Joliet-Naperville, IL-IN-WI MSA

42

33460

Minneapolis-St. Paul-Bloomington, MN-WI MSA

18

37980

Philadelphia-Camden-Wilmington, PA-NJ-DE-MD MSA

18

31100

Los Angeles-Long Beach-Santa Ana, CA MSA

17

14460

Boston-Cambridge-Quincy, MA-NH MSA

16

41180

St. Louis, MO-IL MSA

15

14860

Bridgeport-Stamford-Norwalk, CT MSA

12

41860

San Francisco-Oakland-Fremont, CA MSA

12

12060

Atlanta-Sandy Springs-Marietta, GA MSA

11

17460

Cleveland-Elyria-Mentor, OH MSA

11

19100

Dallas-Fort Worth-Arlington, TX MSA

11

19820

Detroit-Warren-Livonia, MI MSA

11

40060

Richmond, VA MSA

11

38300

Pittsburgh, PA MSA

10

47900

Washington-Arlington-Alexandria, DC-VA-MD-WV MSA

9

16740

Charlotte-Gastonia-Rock Hill, NC-SC MSA

7

25540

Hartford-West Hartford-East Hartford, CT MSA

7

26420

Houston-Sugar Land-Baytown, TX MSA

7

42660

Seattle-Tacoma-Bellevue, WA MSA

7

17140

Cincinnati-Middletown, OH-KY-IN MSA

6

33340

Milwaukee-Waukesha-West Allis, WI MSA

6

38900

Portland-Vancouver-Hillsboro, OR-WA MSA

6

41940

San Jose-Sunnyvale-Santa Clara, CA MSA

5

12580

Baltimore-Towson, MD MSA

4

14260

Boise City-Nampa, ID MSA

4

19740

Denver-Aurora-Broomfield, CO MSA

4

28140

Kansas City, MO-KS MSA

4

33100

Miami-Fort Lauderdale-Pompano Beach, FL MSA

4

Various

Other charitable communities

13

Other non-charitable communities

109

Total
475
Charitable communities are highlighted in bold (Lydenberg, Marlin, and Strub, 1986; Navarro, 1988).
Other charitable communities not listed (with number of firms in parentheses) include Birmingham, AL
(2), Duluth, MN (1), Jacksonville, FL (2), Louisville, KY (1), Norfolk, VA (1), Phoenix, AZ (3) and
Rochester, NY (3).
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Table 1. Sample breakdown
Panel C: Industry composition
SIC
code
Description

Number of firms

49

Electric, Gas, And Sanitary Services

56

28

Chemicals And Allied Products

47

60

Depository Institutions

40

20

Food And Kindred Products

27

37

Transportation Equipment

24

35

Industrial And Commercial Machinery And Computer Equipment

23

63

Insurance Carriers

20

27

Printing, Publishing, And Allied Industries

19

26

Paper And Allied Products

18

48

Communications

16

38

Measuring, Analyzing, And Controlling Instruments

16

29

Petroleum Refining And Related Industries

15

36

Electronic And Other Electrical Equipment And Components, Except Computer Equipment

15

33

Primary Metal Industries

12

53

General Merchandise Stores

8

30

Rubber And Miscellaneous Plastics Products

8

61

Non-depository Credit Institutions

6

51

Wholesale Trade-non-durable Goods

6

73

Business Services

6

25

Furniture And Fixtures

6

Other Industries

87

Total

475
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Table 2. Descriptive statistics and correlations
Mean

SD

Min

Max

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

1.

Philanthropic contributions

1.24

1.27

0

9.38

2.

KLD rated × Initial positive rating

0.07

0.25

0

1

0.13

3.

KLD rated × No initial positive rating

0.32

0.46

0

1

-0.07

-0.10

4.

Charitable community

0.13

0.34

0

1

0.06

0.05

-0.01

5.

Socially contested industry

0.11

0.31

0

1

0.15

0.06

0.03

-0.05

6.

Revenue (log)t-1

8.08

1.16

4.78

12.02

0.06

0.10

0.21

-0.01

0.25

7.

Foundation assets (log)t-1

1.21

1.21

0

5.94

0.06

0.11

0.07

0.00

0.10

0.37

8.

Return on assets (ROA)t-1

14.05

8.20

-12.66

93.90

-0.17

0.03

0.07

0.04

0.05

-0.10

0.02

9.

Contributions of industry peerst-1

0.09

0.05

0.00

0.30

-0.01

0.06

0.10

-0.02

-0.06

-0.14

0.02

0.16

10.

Marginal tax ratet

31.24

7.58

0.00

35.00

-0.07

0.03

0.02

0.04

-0.05

-0.02

0.06

0.09

Note. 2,714 firm-year observations
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9

0.13

Table 3. Firm response after initial KLD rating

(A)
(B)

KLD rated × Initial positive rating
KLD rated × No initial positive rating
Revenue (log)t-1

(1)

(2)

Baseline

Aggregated

-0.477

**

(0.152)

-0.001

-0.026

(0.094)

(0.089)

-0.545

***

(0.131)
Foundation assets (log)t-1

-0.132
-0.037

*

-1.804

***

0.013

-0.099
-0.038

*

-3.796

*

(1.756)
**

0.017

(0.004)

(0.009)

Year Fixed Effects

Yes

Yes

Firm Fixed Effects

Yes

Yes

Community Fixed Effects

Yes

Yes

Industry Fixed Effects

Yes

Yes

2,714

950

Observations

***

(0.011)

(0.789)
Marginal tax ratet

*

(0.077)

(0.007)
Contributions of industry peerst-1

-0.436

**

(0.189)

(0.051)
Return on assets (ROA)t-1

-0.490

(0.165)

Firms

475

475

R-squared (within)

0.16

0.17

Wald test: coefficient (A) = (B)?

8.37

**

8.57

**

OLS regression coefficients with robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p < 0.001, **
p < 0.01, * p < 0.05. Wald test displays F test statistic where the null hypothesis is that the
coefficients are statistically indistinguishable. The baseline model is displayed in column
1 and the aggregated model to adjust for serial correlation in column 2.
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Table 4. Rating effects moderated by community norms
(1)
(A)

Charitable community × KLD rated × Initial positive rating

(B)

Charitable community × KLD rated × No initial positive rating

-0.183
(0.171)
0.102
(0.176)

(C)

Non-charitable community × KLD rated × Initial positive rating

(D)

Non-charitable community × KLD rated × No initial positive rating

-0.545

**

(0.193)
-0.019
(0.095)
Year Fixed Effects

Yes

Firm Fixed Effects

Yes

Community Fixed Effects

Yes

Industry Fixed Effects

Yes

Observations

2,714

Firms

475

R-squared (within)

0.16

Wald test: coefficient (A) = (B)?

1.71

Wald test: coefficient (C) = (D)?

7.14

**

OLS regression coefficients with robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p < 0.001, ** p <
0.01, * p < 0.05. Wald test displays F test statistic where the null hypothesis is that the
coefficients are statistically indistinguishable. Control variables are not displayed to preserve
space but are available in Table A2 in the Appendix.
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Table 5. Rating effects moderated by industry risk
(1)
(A)

Socially contested industry × KLD rated × Initial positive rating

(B)

Socially contested industry × KLD rated × No initial positive rating

-0.166
(0.157)
-0.143
(0.265)

(C)

Non-socially contested industry × KLD rated × Initial positive rating

(D)

Non-socially contested industry × KLD rated × No initial positive rating

-0.544

**

(0.190)
0.026
(0.091)
Year Fixed Effects

Yes

Firm Fixed Effects

Yes

Community Fixed Effects

Yes

Industry Fixed Effects

Yes

Observations

2,714

Firms

475

R-squared (within)

0.17

Wald test: coefficient (A) = (B)?

0.01

Wald test: coefficient (C) = (D)?

8.80

**

OLS regression coefficients with robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p < 0.001, ** p < 0.01,
* p < 0.05. Wald test displays F test statistic where the null hypothesis is that the coefficients are
statistically indistinguishable. Control variables are not displayed to preserve space but are available
in Table A3 in the Appendix.
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APPENDIX
History and Timing of KLD’s Initial Ratings
Established in 1988, KLD’s original objective was to build an index of stocks that would
track the costs and benefits of applying social screens to investments decisions (see Godfrey,
2011 for a more detailed overview). This index was later named the Domini 400 Social Index
and was launched on June 1, 1991. To justify their decisions to investors, the founders
established a research database that would provide structure and a rigorous selection criteria to
their burgeoning index. Initially the database and its underlying ratings was seen as a tool that
would facilitate the production and maintenance of the Index (i.e. a means to an end). The
founders, however, soon realized that their most valuable product was the ratings database, not
the index. Accordingly, KLD quickly shifted their marketing strategy from providing investment
services via the fund to selling their research database. According to Sharfman (1996), the 1991
ratings were first made available to researchers in August of 1992. The ratings, however, did not
appear to gain widespread publicity until 1993 (see Figure A1). Given these findings, I thus
consider 1993 to be the first rating year, even though the rating decisions were based on
performance data from 1991. Because inertial factors such as budgets and commitments to
nonprofits would have likely constrained an immediate response, I did not expect them to have
any significant influence on corporate donations until 1994.

55

7

25

6

20

5
4

15

3

10

2

5

1
0

1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
National Newspapers

0

# of Articles (All Newspapers)

# of Articles (National Newspapers)

Figure A1. Media attention to KLD

All Newspapers

Notes: Counts were obtained from Factiva for all newspaper articles that referenced the
term “Kinder, Lydenberg, Domini” from 1990-2000. Newspapers of national repute
include the New York Times, Washington Post, Wall Street, Journal, Chicago Tribune,
USA Today, and the Los Angeles Times (McDonnell and King, 2013; McDonnell and
Werner, 2016).
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Parallel Trends Assumption
I examine the trends among the three groups during the pre-rating period (1991-1993) using a
regression model which includes lags of the treatment variables (KLD rated × initial positive
rating and KLD rated × no initial positive rating). I designate 1993, treatment year, as the
omitted category. Significant coefficients would indicate that pre-treatment trends for firms that
were rated by KLD differed significantly from firms that were never rated. As can be seen in
Table A1, the coefficients were not statistically significant indicating that firms that were rated
by KLD displayed similar trends in charitable contributions to firms that were never rated in the
pre-treatment period. A Wald Test comparing the coefficients of the two interaction terms in t-2,
and t-1 similarly indicate that firms initially rated as charitable exhibited similar pre-treatment
trends to firms that were initially rated but not recognized. Coupled with a visual depiction of
these trends in Figure 1, these results provide strong support for the parallel trends assumption.
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Table A1. Test for Parallel Trends
(1)
(A)

KLD rated × Initial positive rating (t-2)

(B)

KLD rated × No initial positive rating (t-2)

-0.043
(0.261)
-0.155
(0.100)

(C)

KLD rated × Initial positive rating (t-1)

(D)

KLD rated × No initial positive rating (t-1)

-0.151
(0.186)
-0.049
(0.088)

Revenue (log)t-1

-0.490

*

(0.217)
Foundation assets (log)t-1

-0.228

*

(0.101)
Return on assets (ROA)t-1

-0.014
(0.012)

Contributions of industry peerst-1

-2.135
(1.267)

Marginal tax ratet

0.015

**

(0.006)
Year Fixed Effects

Yes

Firm Fixed Effects

Yes

Community Fixed Effects

Yes

Industry Fixed Effects

Yes

Observations

1,371

Firms

475

R-squared (within)

0.12

Wald test: coefficient (A) = (B)?

0.19

Wald test: coefficient (C) = (D)?

0.33

OLS regression coefficients with robust standard errors in
parentheses. *** p < 0.001, ** p < 0.01, * p < 0.05. Wald test
displays F test statistic where the null hypothesis is that the
coefficients are statistically indistinguishable. Subsample includes all
firm-year observations in the pre-rating period (1991-1993).
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Table A2. Rating effects moderated by community norms
(1)
(A)

Charitable community × KLD rated × Initial positive rating

(B)

Charitable community × KLD rated × No initial positive rating

-0.183
(0.171)
0.102
(0.176)

Charitable community × Revenue (log)t-1

-0.521
(0.315)

Charitable community × Foundation assets (log)t-1

-0.118
(0.114)

Charitable community × Return on assets (ROA)t-1

-0.022
(0.022)

Charitable community × Contributions of industry peerst-1

-2.522
(1.621)

Charitable community × Marginal tax ratet

0.013
(0.012)

(C)

Non-charitable community × KLD rated × Initial positive rating

-0.545

**

(0.193)
(D)

Non-charitable community × KLD rated × No initial positive rating

-0.019
(0.095)

Non-charitable community × Revenue (log)t-1

-0.548

***

(0.138)
Non-charitable community × Foundation assets (log)t-1

-0.130

*

(0.058)
Non-charitable community × Return on assets (ROA)t-1

-0.038

***

(0.008)
Non-charitable community × Contributions of industry peerst-1

-1.696
(0.881)

Non-charitable community × Marginal tax ratet

0.013

**

(0.005)
Observations

2,714

Firms

475

R-squared (within)

0.16

Wald test: coefficient (A) = (B)?

1.71

Wald test: coefficient (C) = (D)?

7.14

**

OLS regression coefficients with robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p < 0.001, ** p <
0.01, * p < 0.05. Wald test displays F test statistic where the null hypothesis is that the
coefficients are statistically indistinguishable. This model includes firm, year, community and
industry, fixed-effects
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Table A3. Rating effects moderated by industry risk
(1)
(A)

Socially contested industry × KLD rated × Initial positive rating

(B)

Socially contested industry × KLD rated × No initial positive rating

-0.166
(0.157)
-0.143
(0.265)

Socially contested industry × Revenue (log)t-1

-0.562
(0.441)

Socially contested industry × Foundation assets (log)t-1

-0.384
(0.252)

Socially contested industry × Return on assets (ROA)t-1

-0.079

*

(0.036)
Socially contested industry × Contributions of industry peerst-1

1.704
(2.499)

Socially contested industry × Marginal tax ratet

0.021
(0.012)

(C)

Non-socially contested industry × KLD rated × Initial positive rating

-0.544

**

(0.190)
(D)

Non-socially contested industry × KLD rated × No initial positive rating

0.026
(0.091)

Non-socially contested industry × Revenue (log)t-1

-0.548

***

(0.140)
Non-socially contested industry × Foundation assets (log)t-1

-0.081
(0.046)

Non-socially contested industry × Return on assets (ROA)t-1

-0.032

***

(0.007)
Non-socially contested industry × Contributions of industry peerst-1

-2.347

**

(0.809)
Non-socially contested industry × Marginal tax ratet

0.012

*

(0.005)
Observations

2,714

Firms

475

R-squared (within)

0.17

Wald test: coefficient (A) = (B)?

0.01

Wald test: coefficient (C) = (D)?

8.80

**

OLS regression coefficients with robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p < 0.001, ** p < 0.01, *
p < 0.05. Wald test displays F test statistic where the null hypothesis is that the coefficients are
statistically indistinguishable. This model includes firm, year, community and industry, fixed-effects
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Figure A2. Trends in Philanthropic Contributions
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1992

1993

Table A4. Firm response after initial KLD rating - Placebo Tests (1988-1993)

(A)
(B)

KLD rated × Initial positive rating
KLD rated × No initial positive rating
Revenue (log)t-1

(1)

(2)

(3)

Baseline

Extreme

Reverse

0.033

-0.102

0.243

(0.140)

(0.218)

(0.148)

0.163

0.165

0.085

(0.099)

(0.093)

(0.100)

-0.784

***

(0.219)
Foundation assets (log)t-1

-0.033
(0.010)

Return on assets (ROA)t-1
Contributions of industry peerst-1
Marginal tax ratet

-0.785

***

(0.218)
**

-0.034
(0.010)

-0.776

**

-0.034

**

(0.010)

-0.109

-0.106

-0.114

(0.059)

(0.058)

(0.060)

-0.315

-0.339

-0.312

(0.640)

(0.633)

(0.642)

0.001

0.001

0.001

(0.006)

(0.006)

(0.006)

Year Fixed Effects

Yes

Yes

Yes

Firm Fixed Effects

Yes

Yes

Yes

Community Fixed Effects

Yes

Yes

Yes

Industry Fixed Effects

Yes

Yes

Yes

2,537

2,537

2,537

Observations

***

(0.219)

Firms

448

448

448

R-squared (within)

0.09

0.09

0.09

Wald test: coefficient (A) = (B)?

0.88

1.56

1.16

OLS regression coefficients with robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p < 0.001, ** p < 0.01, * p < 0.05.
Wald test displays F test statistic where the null hypothesis is that the coefficients are statistically
indistinguishable. I display the baseline placebo treatment in column 1 (recognition threshold > 1.5%), the
extreme placebo treatment (recognition threshold >2.25%) in column 2, and the reverse placebo treatment
(recognition threshold < 0.5%) in column 3.
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